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Entry costs vary dramatically across countries. To assess their impact on cross-country di⁄erences
in output and TFP, we construct a model with endogenous entry and operation decisions by ￿rms.
We calibrate the model to match the U.S. distribution of employment and ￿rms by size. Higher
entry costs lead to greater misallocation of productive factors and lower TFP and output. In the
model, countries in the lowest decile of the entry costs distribution have 1.32 to 1.45 times higher
TFP and 1.52 to 1.75 times higher output per worker than countries in the highest decile. As in
the data, higher entry costs are associated with lower entry rates and business density.
JEL: L16, O11, O4.
Keywords: entry costs, TFP, industry structure.1 Introduction
Cross-country di⁄erences in legal barriers to entry provide one of the most striking examples of
institutional failure. A key measure of these barriers are legal fees for registering a small domes-
tically operating ￿rm. They are negligible in most developed countries, but average 32 percent of
output per worker and reach as high as 764 percent. We show that the variability in barriers to
entry accounts for a substantial part of the cross-country di⁄erences in productivity and output per
worker. We do so by constructing a model with heterogeneous ￿rms in which a higher entry cost
distorts the industry structure, allowing low-productivity ￿rms to operate. We ￿nd that a 1 percent
increase in entry costs is associated with a 0:14 percent decline in TFP, while the corresponding
statistic in the data is 0:52 percent. Due to the enormous variation in entry costs this elasticity
translates into large di⁄erences in economic outcomes: In the model, countries in the bottom decile
of the entry cost distribution have, on average, 1:32 times higher TFP and 1:52 times higher output
per worker than countries in the upper decile.
Our study of the e⁄ects of entry costs in a general equilibrium setting builds on the seminal
contributions of Hopenhayn [1992] and Hopenhayn and Rogerson [1993]. In our model, ￿rms are ex-
ante identical and face a sunk cost of entry, consisting of regulatory/legal fees and a nonregulatory
component (i.e., securing a physical location, initial capital investment, advertisement, etc.). Once
the entry cost is paid, the ￿rm receives an i.i.d. productivity draw. The ￿rm￿ s productivity does
not change over time and ￿rms face an exogenous death probability. At the ￿rm level, production is
subject to decreasing returns to scale with a ￿xed operating cost (overhead labor)￿ only ￿rms with
su¢ ciently high productivity draws choose to operate. We show that the model aggregates into a
variant of the neoclassical growth model with constant returns to scale and endogenous TFP. We
establish a log-linear negative relation between TFP and the entry cost. The mechanism behind
this result traces back to Hopenhayn [1992]: With free entry, a higher entry cost implies that fewer
entrants pay the sunk cost and receive productivity draws. Wages are lower since there is less
competition for labor. Lower-productivity ￿rms choose to operate, sullying the pool of producers;
￿rms￿average productivity and TFP are smaller.
We assume that nonregulatory entry costs, measured as a fraction of output per worker, are con-
stant across countries.1 Since the model predicts a log-linear relation between TFP and the overall
1We show in Section 3 that this assumption is conservative in terms of the model￿ s ability to explain cross-country
1entry cost￿ i.e., inclusive of the nonregulatory component￿ the magnitude of the nonregulatory
costs is of key importance to our analysis: The smaller these costs are the larger the cross-country
productivity di⁄erences caused by the variation in legal entry barriers. We rely on recent advances
in the empirical IO literature to pin down the magnitude of the nonregulatory sunk costs in pro-
portion to the ￿xed operating cost. As a benchmark we use the average estimated ratio of the sunk
cost to the operating cost from Aguirregabiria and Mira [2007] and Dunne et al. [2009]. Although
both studies cover di⁄erent industries, the estimates are close and concentrated around 1. The ￿rst
study covers restaurants, gas stations, bookstores, shoe shops, and ￿sh shops, and the second deals
with dentists and chiropractors in three di⁄erent market settings. We also consider the estimates
from Collard-Wexler [2008] and Suzuki [2009]. Collard-Wexler [2008] reports an average ratio of
5:94 for the ready-mix concrete industry, while Suzuki [2009] ￿nds an average ratio of 4:31 for the
hotel industry. In both industries, most of sunk entry costs arise from construction costs of business
premises.
For a given entry-to-operating cost ratio, our model features two additional parameters beyond
those in the standard neoclassical growth model: the dispersion of the ￿rms￿productivity draws
and the magnitude of the ￿xed operating cost. We calibrate them to match the distributions of
employment and ￿rms by size in the U.S.
We derive our benchmark results by feeding the calibrated model the measure of entry costs
constructed by adding to each country￿ s legal fees the estimated nonregulatory cost. Implicit in
this experiment is an assumption that the representative ￿rm is a standardized ￿rm, for which the
cross-country measures of legal entry barriers are constructed. That is, it faces no additional legal
entry barriers and, in particular, is not required to pay up front for building or setting up business
premises. We assume that all economies in our dataset are identical except for the legal cost of
entry. We compute TFP and output in steady state for each country and compare them with
their empirical counterparts. Our calibrated model accounts for 25 percent of the unconditional
correlation between entry costs and TFP across countries observed in the data and 16 percent of
the correlation between entry costs and output. In the model, countries in the lower decile of the
entry cost distribution have, on average, 1:32 times higher TFP than countries in the upper decile.
We consider alternative measures of entry costs. We add the costs of construction permits and
income and productivity di⁄erences.
2related legal expenses for setting up business premises to our benchmark measure of entry barriers.
We calibrate the nonregulatory entry cost to match the average entry-to-operating cost ratio from
Collard-Wexler [2008]. Here the representative ￿rm is one with a high nonregulatory entry cost due
to large initial sunk investment into business premises. Such a ￿rm, of course, faces the additional
legal burden of obtaining construction permits and other relevant approvals. The model generates
45 percent productivity di⁄erences between countries in the lower decile and the upper decile of
the entry cost distribution.
We also pursue an alternative calibration strategy. We extend our model along the lines of
Hopenhayn and Rogerson [1993] to allow for ￿rms￿productivity to evolve stochastically. We cali-
brate the model parameters, including the entry cost, to match the following features of the U.S.
economy: the distribution of ￿rms and employment by ￿rms￿size, the entry rate, a measure of job
turnover (the gross job reallocation rate), the average size of entering and exiting ￿rms relative to
the average size of incumbents, and the aggregate value of ￿rms￿organization capital. The result-
ing cross country di⁄erences in productivity and output induced by the variation in entry costs are
similar to those found in the benchmark exercise. This model also captures a signi￿cant part of
the negative correlation between the entry cost and the entry rate and between the entry cost and
business density.
Overall, our results echo recent empirical ￿ndings on the nature of the productivity gap be-
tween rich and developing countries. The McKinsey Global Institute [2001] reports that ￿market
regulations restrict competition and best practice￿in India and that it is the prevalence of small,
relatively unproductive units, operating alongside a few large productive ￿rms, that leads to lower
e¢ ciency in many industries. The McKinsey Global Institute [2006] study of Brazil emphasizes
that improper regulation is a major contributor to slow productivity growth; it also stresses the
prevalence of small unproductive ￿rms in many Brazilian industries. Nicoletti and Scarpetta [2003]
estimate that entry liberalization has a positive e⁄ect on productivity in a sample of OECD coun-
tries. Bastos and Nasir [2004] ￿nd that competitive pressure accounts for a signi￿cant part of the
variation in ￿rm-level productivity in ￿ve transition economies.
Several authors have argued that distortions to the allocation of resources across ￿rms are a
major determinant of cross-country income di⁄erences. Hsieh and Klenow [2009] argue that a sig-
ni￿cant share of the TFP gap between China (India) and the U.S. is due to a misallocation of
3productive factors across plants. They ￿nd that if capital and labor in China (India) were reallo-
cated to mimic the distribution of marginal products in the U.S., it would generate productivity
increases of 30 to 50 percent (40 to 60 percent). Restuccia and Rogerson [2008] analyze the po-
tential impact of idiosyncratic tax schemes on resource allocation. They report that the resulting
price heterogeneity faced by individual ￿rms may lead to a 30 to 50 percent decline in productiv-
ity. Guner et al. [2008] analyze quantitatively the macroeconomic impact of policies that distort
￿rms￿size. Alfaro et al. [2008] perform a similar exercise in a model with di⁄erentiated products.2
Buera et al. [2010] argue that an underdeveloped ￿nancial sector leads to a signi￿cant decline in
productivity and output. Their model produces about 40 percent productivity di⁄erences between
the most and the least ￿nancially developed countries. As opposed to most of these contributions,
our analysis directly relies on observable measures of entry barriers available for a large number of
countries. A recent paper by Moscoso Boedo and Mukoyama [2009] studies the impact of entry and
￿ring costs on productivity and output. Though similar to our model, their model di⁄ers from ours
in its calibration strategy, formulation of the operating cost, endogeneity of labor. Most impor-
tantly, their modeling and calibration strategy implies that entry costs a⁄ect productivity almost
entirely through ￿rms￿size: Poor countries have fewer but larger ￿rms than rich countries. In our
model, the main mechanism through which the entry cost a⁄ects TFP is the average productivity
of producing ￿rms; moreover, it is consistent with any (positive or negative) relationship between
entry costs and ￿rms￿average size.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 brie￿ y describes the data used in the
paper. Section 3 describes our benchmark model and main results. Section 4 assesses the robustness
of our results. We conclude in Section 5. Data sources and de￿nitions are given in the Appendix.
2 Data
In this section we describe the data used in our analysis. Data sources and de￿nitions are provided
in Appendix A. The two key measures of economic activity that we consider are output per worker
and TFP. Output per worker is measured as real output per person in the workforce for year 2000
from the Penn World Table 6:1 [see Heston et al., 2002]. We construct TFP (in logs) following
2See also Herrendorf and Teixeira [2005], Erosa and Hidalgo-Cabrillana [2008], Buera and Shin [2010], and Burstein
and Monge-Naranjo [2009].
4Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare [2005]: We subtract human capital per worker (based on educational
attainment) and physical capital per worker from output per worker (all in logs). Both measures
of capital are weighted by their share in national income, 2=3 and 1=3, respectively.
The regulatory component of the cost of entry is given by the legal fees that domestically owned
￿rms that do not require special licensing must pay before they can legally operate (see the World
Bank￿ s Doing Business surveys 2004-2009). Legal fees range from 0 to 764 percent of output per
worker, with an average value of 32 percent of output per worker and a standard deviation of
78 percent (Table 1). The regulatory entry costs are negatively correlated with TFP and output.
Countries in the ￿rst decile (quartile) of the entry cost distribution have, on average, 3:26 (2:54)
times higher TFP than countries in the last decile (quartile).
Legal entry fees are negatively correlated with business density￿ i.e., the number of legally
operating ￿rms per 100 working age persons￿ and with entry rates.
Our alternative measures of entry barriers include the legal fees of construction permits, utility
connections, and inspections associated with building a physical location in which to operate a
￿rm or establishment, also surveyed by the World Bank. These fees, recorded for a ￿standardized￿
warehouse, are about 10 times higher than the legal fees for registering a ￿rm on average and their
standard deviation is 840 percent of output per worker. Costs of setting up a physical location are
positively correlated with our benchmark measure of entry barriers and are negatively correlated
with productivity and output.
From the same Word Bank￿ s sources, we construct the opportunity costs of an entrepreneur￿ s
time for registering a ￿rm and obtaining construction permits (see Table 1). These measures
translate the number of days required to complete the legal entry procedures into a monetary cost.
These costs are positively correlated with the direct costs of entry and negatively correlated with
measures of economic activity.
Finally, we consider the World Bank￿ s measures of the minimum capital requirement￿ the
amount ￿rms must deposit in a bank before they can legally start a business. This requirement
may represent additional costs for starting a business (see Table 1), especially in economies with
tight credit constraints. Minimum capital requirements are positively correlated with entry costs
and negatively correlated with productivity and output. However, only the correlation with TFP
is statistically signi￿cant.
53 The Benchmark Model
In this section we present our benchmark model and calibration strategy. We then study the link
between entry costs and output, productivity, and other variables of interest.
Our benchmark model is a variant of the standard one-sector neoclassical growth model with
heterogeneous ￿rms ￿ la Hopenhayn [1992]. It is close to the model developed in Hopenhayn and
Rogerson [1993] and Atkeson and Kehoe [2005].
3.1 The Model
The model economy is populated by in￿nitely lived households and ￿rms, and the government.
3.1.1 Households
There is a continuum of measure 1 of households that inelastically supply N units of labor (workers),







￿tU(Ct); ￿ 2 (0;1) (3.1)
s.t. Ct + Kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Kt = rtKt + wtN + ￿t + TRt;
where Ct denotes consumption, Kt is household capital, rt is the rental rate on capital, and wt
is the wage. The variable ￿t denotes the ￿rms￿pro￿ts, and TRt is a lump-sum transfer from the
government; ￿ and ￿ 2 (0;1) are the discount rate and depreciation rate, respectively.
3.1.2 Firms
Firms are ex-ante identical and maximize pro￿ts. There is a strictly positive sunk entry cost, ￿t,
which consists of a nonregulatory component, ￿NR
t , and a legal entry fee, ￿R
t . We assume that both
types of entry costs are a constant fraction of GDP per worker (i.e., that the ratios ~ ￿t = ￿tN=Yt;
~ ￿R = ~ ￿R
t N=Yt and ~ ￿R
t = ￿R
t N=Yt are constant over time). After the ￿xed entry cost is paid, each
￿rm receives a productivity draw a from a distribution F. The production function for a ￿rm
with productivity a is given by y = a1￿￿ ￿
k￿n1￿￿￿￿, where k and n denote capital and labor,
6respectively. The parameter ￿ 2 (0;1) determines the degree of returns to scale in variable inputs.3
The parameter ￿ 2 (0;1) pins down the capital share of output.
If a ￿rm decides to produce, it incurs an operating cost in terms of wages paid to ￿ units of








￿ rtkt ￿ wt (nt + ￿): (3.2)
Firms face a constant, exogenous exit rate, ￿. A ￿rm with productivity a will operate only if its
value its non-negative:













The distribution of productivity for operating ￿rms evolves according to
Ht+1 (a) =
(1 ￿ ￿)Ht (a) + et
R a
0 xt (a)dF (a)
(1 ￿ ￿) + et
R 1
0 xt (a)dF (a)
; (3.4)
where xt (a) is the operation decision for a ￿rm and et is the measure of entry.
3.1.3 Aggregation
The existence of economy-wide competitive factor markets implies that in equilibrium, the output,













which, in turn, implies that the economy￿ s aggregate output can be written as





where ￿t is the measure of operating ￿rms, ￿ at is the ￿rms￿average productivity, and Kt and Nt
are aggregate capital and labor, respectively. Let ut denote the fraction of labor used directly in
production. Notice that each operating ￿rm employs ￿ units of overhead labor. By de￿nition, the
3This is the managers￿￿span of control,￿as in Lucas [1978, p. 511].
7number of operating ￿rms (times ￿) is equal to the amount of labor used as overhead: (1￿ut)Nt =


















There are two variable components of TFP: One is ￿rms￿average productivity, ￿ at, and the other,
the term in brackets, depends on the allocation of labor between productive and overhead use.
The relations between ￿rm-level variables and aggregate variables (capital, labor, and pro￿ts),
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where et and ￿t denote the measures of ￿rms entering the market in period t and operating in









3.1.4 Government Budget Constraint and Resource Constraint




The resource constraint is
Ct + et￿NR
t + Kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Kt = Yt: (3.15)
83.1.5 Competitive Equilibrium
An equilibrium is a sequence of prices, frt;wtg
1
t=0; factor demands, fnt(a);kt(a)g
1
t=0; ￿rms￿operat-
ing decisions, measures of entry and operation, fet;￿tg
1






(i) consumers choose C and K optimally by solving problem (3:1);
(ii) ￿rms optimize: the factor demand functions, k and n, solve problem (3:2); the operation
decision is optimal, i.e., only ￿rms generating non-negative pro￿ts choose to operate;
(iii) the free entry condition, eq. (3:3), is satis￿ed;
(iv) the distribution of ￿rms￿productivity evolves according to (3:4)
(v) markets clear, i.e., eqs. (3:8), (3:9), and (3:15) are satis￿ed;
(vi) the government￿ s budget constraint, eq. (3:14), is satis￿ed.
A steady-state equilibrium is an equilibrium in which the prices and quantities as well as the
measures of entry and of ￿rms￿productivity are all constant over time.
3.2 Steady State Properties of the Model
The ￿rst-order conditions of problem (3:2) imply that pro￿ts from producing are equal to the ￿rm￿ s
share of the gross pro￿ts (1 ￿ ￿) minus the operating cost:
￿(a) = (1 ￿ ￿)a1￿￿ ￿
k￿n1￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿w:





Pro￿ts are increasing in a ￿rm￿ s productivity. Therefore, as long as a = 0 is in the support of F,
there exists a cuto⁄level of productivity, a, which makes the marginal ￿rm indi⁄erent to producing
or not: i.e., V (a) = 0 or, equivalently, ￿ (a) = 0. Firms with productivity above the cuto⁄ will
produce, and those with lower productivity will not.
9In steady state the entry rate and the exit rate coincide. This implies that the distribution of






1￿F(a) for a ￿ a
0 for a < a
;




1 ￿ F (a)













The cuto⁄ condition, ￿ (a) = 0, and eq. (3:13) imply that the fraction of labor used in production





1￿￿ a + a
:
Substituting for w from eq. (3:13) and then for u from the expression above in the free-entry
condition, we obtain an equation relating the entry cost (relative to output) to the productivity
cuto⁄ a:














(1 ￿ F (a)); (3.17)
















Di⁄erentiating the right-hand side of eqs. (3:17) and (3:18) we obtain that the cuto⁄, a(~ ￿), is
a decreasing function of the entry cost, ~ ￿, and that TFP is an increasing function of the cuto⁄.
Therefore, TFP (~ ￿) is decreasing in the entry cost. The intuition behind this result traces back to
Hopenhayn [1992]. With free entry, a higher entry cost discourages entry. Fewer entrants pay the
sunk cost and receive productivity draws. Wages and the productivity cuto⁄ decline since there is
4If F has support over [x;1); where x is strictly positive, then the free-entry condition can be written as in eq.
(3:16) as long as (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿
x
￿ a) ￿ 1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿
(1￿￿)￿
ux ; where ￿ a is the expected value of F and u
x is the solution to the
following equation: ~ ￿ =
(1￿￿￿)ux￿(1￿￿)￿
(1￿ux)ux : If the inequality is not satis￿ed, then the productivity cuto⁄ is x and u
x is
the amount of labor engaged directly in production.
10less competition for labor. Thus, lower-productivity ￿rms choose to operate, sullying the pool of
producers; ￿rms￿average productivity and TFP fall.
As expressions (3:17) and (3:18) show, the elasticity of TFP to the entry cost depends on the
properties of the underlying distribution of productivity draws. We consider two distributions
commonly used in the literature [see Axtell, 2001, Atkeson and Kehoe, 2005]: Pareto and log-
normal. Suppose ￿rms draw their productivity from a Pareto distribution: i.e., F (a;￿) = 1 ￿ a￿￿,
a 2 [1;1), ￿ > 1. In this case, average productivity is a linear function of the productivity level
of the marginal ￿rm, a
a = ￿
￿￿1, implying that the free-entry condition (3:17) describes a log-linear
relationship between the entry cost and marginal productivity:
lna = constant ￿
1
￿
ln ~ ￿. (3.19)
It follows that TFP is a linear function of the entry cost (both in logs) and that the elasticity of
TFP to the entry cost is fully determined by the managerial span of control, ￿, and by the Pareto
parameter, ￿5:
lnTFP = constant ￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿
ln ~ ￿: (3.20)
In the case of a log-normal distribution it is not possible to derive a closed-form relationship
between the entry cost and TFP. However, our computations show a close-to-linear relationship.
The elasticity of TFP to the entry cost is determined by the span of control parameter and the
variance of the ￿rms￿productivity draws.
In anticipation of our main results, we note that eq. (3:20) is the key expression of the paper
since, for a given ratio
1￿￿
￿ ; it maps the cross-country di⁄erences in the entry cost into the cross-
country di⁄erences in productivity and output. This expression also illustrates that the mapping
from legal entry costs to economic outcomes depends signi￿cantly on the magnitude of other non-
regulatory components of the entry cost, such as initial sunk capital purchases, market research,
and advertising. Throughout the paper we assume that the nonregulatory component of the entry
cost, ~ ￿NR, as a fraction of output per worker, is invariant across countries. Thus, for each country
i the overall entry cost is the sum of the nonregulatory cost of entry and of the legal, or regulatory,
cost, denoted ~ ￿R
i :
~ ￿i = ~ ￿NR + ~ ￿R
i ;
5We are grateful to an anonymous referee and to Alex Monge for pointing this out.
11and the variation in the second term is the sole cause of cross-country productivity di⁄erences in
the model.
In terms of the model￿ s ability to explain the cross-country productivity and income variation,
we emphasize that this assumption is conservative vis-￿-vis the following two alternatives. First,
empirical evidence suggests that nonregulatory entry costs are mostly in terms of sunk capital
purchases [see Lambson and Jensen, 1998, Gschwandtner and Lambson, 2002, 2006, Collard-Wexler,
2008, Suzuki, 2009]. Thus, one could model ~ ￿NR in units of capital. However, the price of investment
goods varies systematically with income [Restuccia and Urrutia, 2001] and is strongly positively
correlated with legal entry costs. Thus, we would end up having a higher nonregulatory entry
cost in countries with higher legal entry fees. Second, one could assume that the nonregulatory
component of the entry cost is constant across countries in dollars, rather than a fraction of output
per worker. However, recall the free-entry condition in eq. (3:17): The productivity cuto⁄ a and
TFP are decreasing functions of ~ ￿, which is the entry cost expressed as a fraction of output per
worker. By assuming that the nonregulatory component is constant across countries in levels, one
de facto assumes higher ~ ￿ in poorer countries, where legal entry costs are higher.6
3.3 Calibration
We set the neoclassical parameters of our model to standard values and, conditional on the legal
entry fees in the U.S., we choose the parameters determining ￿rms￿productivity levels to match
key features of the distribution of U.S. ￿rms.
We assume that one period in the model represents one year. We choose ￿ so that the steady-
state interest rate is R = 1:041; as in McGrattan and Prescott [2005]. The depreciation rate, ￿,
is set to 0:08: This is the value employed by Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare [2005] to construct the
cross-country TFP measures used in our analysis. The parameter ￿ determines the degree of the
diminishing returns to scale in variable inputs at the ￿rm level. As a benchmark, we set ￿ to
0:85. This value is commonly used in the literature [see Atkeson and Kehoe, 2005, Restuccia and
Rogerson, 2008] and is very close to the estimated value of 0:84 in Basu [1996]. The choice of the
6Put di⁄erently, the observed ￿=Y ratio determines TFP for each country in the model. If ￿ is constant across
countries, than countries with lower output per worker have higher entry barriers. Consequently, a larger fraction of
TFP di⁄erences is attributed to entry costs.
12parameter ￿ depends on the capital share in national income, sk = ￿￿. We set sk to 1=3, which is
the value used by Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare [2005]. This implies that when ￿ is set to 0:85, ￿ is
equal to 0:392. The parameter ￿ is set to 0:082; which yields an entry rate of 8.2% as in Djankov
et al. [2010].
We consider two productivity distributions: a log-normal distribution, F (a;￿;￿),7 and a Pareto
distribution, F (a;￿). We let the data dictate the value of ￿ (or ￿) as well as the amount of overhead
labor, ￿.
The remaining unknown parameter is ~ ￿NR. The free entry condition in eq. (3:16) implies that
it is not the magnitude of the entry cost, but the ratio of the entry to operating cost, that is relevant
for assessing the impact of entry costs on the productivity cuto⁄ a and TFP. We rely on recent
studies by Aguirregabiria and Mira [2007] and Dunne et al. [2009] to pin down this ratio.8 The
ratios of the entry cost to the ￿xed operating cost for di⁄erent industries are summarized in Table
2.9 Remarkably the estimated ratios are close, even though the ￿rst study covers restaurants, gas
stations, bookstores, shoe shops, and ￿sh shops in Chile, while the second deals with dentists and
chiropractors (in three di⁄erent market settings) for the U.S. The highest ratio is for dentists, who
likely require large initial investments into equipment, and the lowest is for bookstores.10 We use
the average ratio, equal to 0:82, to express ~ ￿NR as a function of ￿ (and other parameters of the
model): We set it so that ~ ￿USAYUSA
￿wUSA = (~ ￿NR+~ ￿R
USA)YUSA
￿wUSA = 0:82. The value of legal entry fees for
the U.S. as a fraction of output per worker is 0:0038.
In sum, our model requires two more parameters than the standard neoclassical model, [￿;￿] for
log-normal productivity and [￿;￿] for Pareto productivity. In the model, productivity is roughly
proportional to employment; therefore, we calibrate the productivity distribution to match the
distribution of ￿rms and employment by size classes. Overall, to calibrate our two parameters we
7It can be shown that ￿ is a scale parameter￿ its value has no bearing on our results. We set ￿ to ￿10.
8We note that even though many papers have identi￿ed entry costs as an important element in understanding
industry dynamics, there are few studies that quantify the actual magnitude of sunk entry costs. Exceptions are the
two studies above and Collard-Wexler [2008] and Suzuki [2009]. The estimates in the last two papers are constructed
for industries that require a building to start operation. We discuss these estimates in Section 4.
9Estimates of the entry cost and of the operating cost are in di⁄erent units in the various sources we use (Tables
2 and 5). We refer the reader to the original sources, given that the ratio is all we need to calibrate our model.
10Bookstores and shoe shops (which have the second-lowest ratio) presumably do not require special licensing.
Thus, they are the closest to the standardized ￿rms for which the World Bank surveys legal entry fees.
13use 18 moments from the data depicted as dark gray bars in Figure 1.
The calibration routine determines parameter values that minimize the Euclidean distance be-
tween the moments generated by the model and their empirical counterparts. Figure 1 compares
the moments generated by the calibrated model (Pareto productivity, cream colored; log-normal
productivity, light gray) with their data counterparts. The estimated parameters are reported in
Table 3. The estimated value of ￿ is sizable: In the model, productivity and employment are
proportional and a substantial productivity variance is required to generate the high dispersion of
employment shares across class sizes observed in the data. The value of the parameter ￿ implies
that the smallest ￿rm size in the model is 2:2 employees. This value is close to the minimum ￿rm
size in the data: i.e., one employee. The implied value of the nonregulatory component of the sunk
entry cost is 20:8 percent of output per worker, and the entry cost in the U.S., inclusive of legal
fees, ~ ￿USAYUSA, is $13;670. The latter is comparable to $20;000; which Ellickson [2007] considers
as an upper bound of the entry cost for small businesses in the U.S.
The estimated Pareto parameter, ￿, is close to unity, implying a large dispersion of productivity
draws across ￿rms. The smallest ￿rm size in this case is 2:8 employees. The implied value of the
nonregulatory component of the sunk entry cost is 27:57 percent of output per worker, and the
value of the overall entry cost in the U.S. is $18;040.
Finally, we note that the case with log-normal distribution provides a better ￿t to the data: The
residual sum of squares is 9:28, while for the Pareto distribution it is 137. Except for the following
section, we report only the results implied by the log-normal distribution of productivity draws.
3.4 Empirical Results
We now assess the quantitative e⁄ect of the entry cost on TFP and output. We assume that all
economies in our dataset are identical except for the cost of entry. We normalize the number of
workers, N = 1: For each country, we input into the model the calibrated cost for the U.S. net of
legal fees￿ i.e., (20:8 ￿ 0:38) = 20:42 percent￿ plus the observed legal entry fee for that country.
We compute TFP, the steady-state level of output per worker, and other statistics of interest.
The ￿rst panel of Figure 2 plots the relationship between TFP and the overall entry cost (both
in logs) in the model and in the data when the distribution of productivity draws is log-normal. The
slope of the linear relation in our model is ￿0:14; while in the data it is ￿0:55, implying that the
14model accounts for 25 percent of the (average) relation between the entry cost and TFP observed
in the data. We also compare TFP di⁄erences across countries exhibiting the highest and lowest
entry costs. In the model, countries in the ￿rst decile (quartile) of the entry cost distribution have,
on average, 1:32 (1:23) times higher TFP than countries in the last decile (quartile). In the data
the corresponding value is 3:26 (2:54).
As noted earlier, TFP in our model depends not only on ￿rms￿average productivity, but also
on the allocation of labor between productive and overhead use. On one hand, more ￿rms￿ i.e., a
higher (1 ￿ u)￿ increase aggregate productivity because ￿rms face diminishing returns to scale. On
the other hand, more operating ￿rms imply that fewer workers are engaged directly in production￿
i.e., a smaller u￿ and this reduces TFP.11 Since u is a function of ￿ a=a, the properties of the latter
determine the elasticity of the labor allocation component of TFP to the entry cost. For the log-
normal distribution the average-to-marginal productivity ratio is decreasing: An increase in the
entry cost leads to a decline in the number of operating ￿rms and a decline in the labor allocation
component of TFP. For the Pareto distribution ￿ a=a is constant and so are the number of operating
￿rms and the labor allocation component of TFP. Yet, the elasticity of TFP to the entry cost is
close to the log-normal case because with the estimated Pareto distribution average productivity
has a higher elasticity to ~ ￿: the slope of the relation between TFP and the entry cost is ￿0:13.12
The second panel of Figure 2 plots the log of output per worker.13 In the model, the relation
between the entry cost and output is linear, with a slope of ￿0:21: The model captures 16 percent
of the observed relation between entry costs and output per worker. It is expected that the model
accounts for a higher fraction of the correlation between the entry cost and TFP than that between
the entry cost and output. In our framework, the entry cost a⁄ects output only through TFP and
not through the capital-to-output ratio. The latter is determined by the steady-state interest rate,
assumed to be identical across countries. Barseghyan [2008] ￿nds these same patterns in the data.
11As long as u > (1 ￿ ￿)=(1 ￿ ￿￿), the ￿rst e⁄ect always dominates: the overall e⁄ect of an increase in the number
of operating ￿rms on labor allocation component of TFP is positive.
12However, in the Pareto case the estimated value of the nonregulatory component of the entry cost is higher,
which implies smaller cross-country di⁄erences in productivity: Countries in the ￿rst decile (quartile) of the entry
cost distribution have, on average, 1:26 (1:19) times higher TFP than countries in the last decile (quartile).
13For ease of comparison, we plot and compute statistics for output only for the countries for which we also have
TFP data available. Including in the analysis the countries for which entry cost and output data are available, but
TFP data are not, does not change our results.
15Moreover, he estimates that the e⁄ect of entry costs on output is about 1:5 times larger than the
e⁄ect on TFP, coinciding with the ratio generated by our model.14 Barseghyan [2008] also ￿nds that
entry costs are correlated with property rights, which a⁄ect output through the capital-to-output
ratio. Hence, the model captures a larger part of the (unconditional) correlation between the entry
cost and TFP than between the entry cost and output.
4 Robustness Analysis and Discussion
In this section we assess the robustness of our ￿ndings along several dimensions and provide ad-
ditional discussion. The results of the experiments below are collected in Tables 4 and 6. In
particular, each row corresponds to a single experiment and reports average income and produc-
tivity di⁄erences between countries in the bottom and top decile (by entry cost).
4.1 Calibration
Returns to scale in variable inputs and capital share of output. In the benchmark calibra-
tion we set the returns to scale in variable inputs to ￿ = 0:85: There is evidence, however, in favor of
lower values of this parameter. Calibration in Guner et al. [2008] yields a value of ￿ = 0:802. Chang
[2000] argues for ￿ = 0:80: Veracierto [2001]￿ s calibration yields a value of ￿ = 0:83. Recalibrating
our model with ￿ = 0:80 allows us to explain an even larger part of the observed relationship
between the entry cost and macroeconomic outcomes (see Table 4, Row 2).
Parente and Prescott [2000, 2005] argue for a higher capital share of output. With sk = 0:65;
the model generates productivity di⁄erences similar to those generated by the benchmark model,
but output di⁄erences are higher (Table 4, Row 3).
Measures of economic performance. In our benchmark analysis we rely on output per
worker and TFP data for the year 2000 as measures of economic performance. Using data for 1996
or 2003 for output (1996 for TFP)15 does not signi￿cantly change any of the statistics reported in
the paper or the quantitative success of our model.
14Recall that in the steady state of the neoclassical growth model, ln(Y ) = constant+1=(1￿sk)￿ln(TFP). When
the share of capital is 1=3, 1=(1 ￿ sk) = 1:5.
15As discussed in Appendix A, TFP data for 2003 are not available.
164.2 Entry Costs: Broader Measures and Correlated Distortions
Broader measures of the cost of entry. The elasticity of TFP to the entry cost derived in
our model does not depend on the entry cost measures.16 The relationship is linear for Pareto
productivity and close to linear for log-normal productivity. Clearly, the cross-country di⁄erences
in productivity and output generated by the model depend on the cross-country variability of entry
costs. A broad measure of the cost of entry implies larger (smaller) cross-country productivity and
income di⁄erences if the broad measure is more (less) volatile than the narrow measure.
In our ￿rst experiment, we add to our benchmark measures of legal entry barriers the time cost
of registering the ￿rm and recalibrate the model. The results do not signi￿cantly di⁄er from those
in the benchmark case and are reported in Table 6 (Row 1).
In our second, third, and fourth experiments, we aim to assess the robustness of our results with
respect to the calibration of the nonregulatory component of the entry costs. In these experiments,
we set the ratio of entry cost to the operating cost in the U.S. to 5:94, which is the average ratio
for ready-mix concrete plants from Collard-Wexler [2008] (see Table 5). His entry cost estimates
re￿ ect mainly the cost of building the premises.17 As discussed in Section 2, the World Bank
provides data on the regulatory costs for building and setting up business premises. We add those
to our benchmark measures of legal entry barriers and recalibrate the model. The resulting cross-
country TFP di⁄erences are larger than in the benchmark model, even though the nonregulatory
component of the entry cost reaches 95 percent of output per worker, which is $73;356 in the U.S.
This is because the costs of building and setting up premises are higher and more variable than the
costs of registering a ￿rm. In the benchmark model, countries in the bottom decile have, on average,
1:45 times higher productivity and 1:75 times higher output per worker than the countries in the
16Using di⁄erent measures of the U.S. entry cost has no e⁄ect on the calibrated value of the Pareto parameter ￿.
The e⁄ect on the calibrated variance of the log-normal distribution is tiny. Consequently, the elasticity of TFP to
the entry cost is practically invariant to changes in the U.S. entry cost measure used for calibration.
17Suzuki [2009] provides another example of an industry that requires initial investment into a building. He ￿nds
that the ratio of the sunk entry cost to the operating cost in the Texas hotel industry is 4:31. Most of the sunk entry
costs in the hotel industry also arise from the expenses associated with building the hotel. Finally, Aguirregabiria and
Ho [2009], study the airline industry and ￿nd the ratio of entry to operating cost of 2:10. We do not use the latter
estimate to calibrate our model because we do not observe regulatory entry barriers into the airline industry across
countries. Presumably, operating an airline entails complying with many more regulations than other industries we
are considering.
17top decile (Table 6, Row 2). The third experiment adds the time costs of (i) building and setting
up premises and (ii) registering the ￿rm to the measure of legal entry barriers used in the second
experiment. The resulting productivity di⁄erences are similar to those in the second experiment
(Table 6, Row 3).
In the fourth experiment, we set the ￿xed-to-operating cost to an extreme value: ￿ve times
the average estimate in Collard-Wexler [2008]. The measure legal entry costs is the same as in the
second experiment. The estimated value of the nonregulatory sunk entry cost is now 317:7 percent
of output per worker, which is $205;030 in the U.S. Yet, even in the presence of such an extreme
nonregulatory sunk cost, the regulatory burden lowers productivity and output from the top to the
bottom decile by 29 and 46 percent, respectively (Table 6, Row 4).
Finally, we consider minimum capital requirements. In many countries, an entrepreneur must
deposit an initial amount of funds into a bank or other depository institution before it can operate
legally. While we recognize that some of these funds might be recoverable, we note that in many
high-entry-cost countries entrepreneurs face severe credit constraints and high interest rates [see
Banerjee and Du￿ o, 2005], e⁄ectively making the minimum capital requirement an additional entry
cost. In row 5 of Table 6 we report the results of an experiment in which the overall entry cost
is the sum of our benchmark measure and 50 percent of the minimum capital requirement. The
resulting di⁄erences in productivity and output are higher than in the benchmark case.
Borrowing constraints. If entrepreneurs must borrow to ￿nance entry, then the e⁄ective cost
will be higher. As noted above, since entrepreneurs typically face higher borrowing costs in poorer
countries, it follows that borrowing constraints would magnify the e⁄ect of entry costs on economic
activity and lead to even higher cross-country productivity di⁄erences than implied by our model.
Corruption. Levels of corruption and entry costs are strongly correlated in the data [see
Barseghyan, 2008]. One can think of corruption as either a tax on ￿rms￿pro￿ts, ￿￿, and/or a
markup on measured entry costs, ￿￿. Corruption acts as a multiplier, (1 + ￿￿)=(1 ￿ ￿￿) > 1,
on entry cost. Countries with higher entry costs tend to have higher rates of corruption. Hence,
corruption magni￿es the negative e⁄ect of higher entry costs on economic activity.
Output net of entry costs. Up to this point we have treated the entry cost payments as
part of a country￿ s income. An alternative assumption is that entry costs represent a deadweight
loss akin to unproductive government spending. To check whether this can a⁄ect our results, we
18compute output net of the entry costs. Net output is almost perfectly correlated with gross output
and these two measures of output have essentially identical elasticities with respect to the entry
cost. In countries with higher entry costs, fewer ￿rms pay the costs of entry and the net-to-gross
output ratio is nearly constant across countries.
4.3 Stochastic Evolution of Firms￿Productivity
In our benchmark analysis in Section 3, we assume that ￿rms face an exogenous death probability
and, conditional on survival, their productivity does not change over time. The non-regulatory
component of the entry cost was pinned down by available estimates of the entry-to-operating cost
ratio. In this section we consider a stochastic law of motion for ￿rms￿productivity similar to that
in Hopenhayn and Rogerson [1993]. This allows us to calibrate the non-regulatory component of
the entry cost￿ and other parameters governing the evolution of ￿rms￿productivity￿ based on
a number of additional features of the U.S. industry structure: the entry rate,18 the gross job
reallocation rate, the size of the entering and exiting ￿rms relative to the size of the incumbents,
and the share of output that is paid to the owners of organization capital.
The structure of the model is identical to that of the benchmark model, except the evolution of
￿rms￿productivity over time: After the ￿xed entry cost is paid, each ￿rm receives a productivity





;ai < aj if i < j: In subsequent periods, each ￿rm￿ s
productivity evolves according to a transition matrix P = fpijgi2(1:N);j2(1:N) :























ai￿ ^ fi: (4.2)
We assume that the economy in a steady-state equilibrium: prices, quantities, and the measures
of entry and operation are all constant over time. In this model, entry(exit) rates, job turnover
rate, the relative size of the entering and exiting ￿rms and organization capital are endogenous. In
18In our model￿ as in other models with a stationary distribution of ￿rms￿ entry and exit rates are equal.
19To economize on notation, we index Vt by the time subscript and suppress state variables as arguments in the
￿rms￿value function.
19particular, for a given distribution ^ F these quantities depend on the transition matrix P and the
entry cost.
We parametrize the model as follows. The distribution ^ F is a discretized log-normal distribution
F (a;￿;￿) over 250 points with an exponential step of 10 percent: ai+1 = 1:10￿ai. The transition
matrix P is fully described by two parameters, pL and pH : for any productivity level aj the
probability of transiting to the productivity level aj+i is equal to (pH)i times the probability of
staying at the productivity level aj; the probability of transiting to the productivity level aj￿i is
(pL)i times the probability of staying at the productivity level aj. To illustrate, a four by four
diagonal block of the matrix P is




















































where Qj￿ s are scaling factors which normalize to one the sum of each column.20
This version of the model requires calibrating two more parameters than the benchmark model:
pL and pH. In addition, we let the data dictate the magnitude of the non-regulatory component of
the entry cost. In total, we need to estimate ￿ve parameters:
￿
￿;￿;pL;pH; ~ ￿NR￿
.21 The model￿ s
empirical properties are determined mostly by the distribution of the ￿rms￿productivity draws at
birth and their evolution over time. Since productivity is proportional to employment, we use the
distribution of ￿rms and employment by size classes, as in Section 3.3. In addition, we aim to
match the entry (exit) rate, the (gross) job reallocation rate, the size of the entering and exiting
￿rms relative to the size of incumbents and organization capital. Overall, we use 22 moments to
calibrate ￿ve parameters.
The vector of calibrated parameters is [3:67; 0:56; 0:74; 0:63; 12:15]: The values of ￿ and ￿ are
similar to those in the benchmark calibration. The ￿rms have a slightly higher chance of transiting
to lower productivity state than to a higher productivity state. The calibrated value of the non-
regulatory component of the entry cost is 12:15 percent of GDP per worker, which is slightly lower











21As in the benchmark analysis, the scale parameter ￿ is set to ￿10.
20than the estimated values in our benchmark calibration.
The model reproduces quite well the distribution of ￿rms and employment by size (see ￿rst two
panels of Figure 3). The entry rate in the model is 6:8 percent, while in the data it is 8:2 percent.
The job reallocation rate in the model is 28:08 percent, in the data it is 26:28 percent. The average
size of the entering and exiting ￿rms relative to the average size of the incumbents is 0:34, which
coincides with its empirical counterpart. Payments to organization capital in the model are 7:6
percent, while in the data they are 8 percent.22
The model matches well a number of statistics that have not been used in the calibration. The
model generates a hazard function that is very close to its empirical counterpart (see the last panel
of Figure 3). The smallest ￿rm size in the model is 2:48 employees.
The slope of the relationship between TFP and entry costs (both in logs) generated by the
model is ￿0:14, which coincides with that in the benchmark model. Since the estimated value of
the entry cost is somewhat smaller than that in the benchmark model, the resulting impact of entry
barriers on economic activity is slightly larger. In this experiment, countries in the ￿rst decile of
the entry cost distribution have, on average, 1:40 (1:67) times higher TFP (output) than countries
in the last decile. In the benchmark case the corresponding ￿gure is 1:32 (1:50).
Finally, the model captures about 18 percent of the negative relationship between entry cost
and business density observed in the data and about 26 percent of the negative relationship between
entry cost and entry rate.23 The slope of the log-log relationship between entry cost and business
density is ￿0:74 in the model and ￿3:85 in the data. The slope of the relationship between entry
cost and entry rate (both in logs) is ￿0:39 in the model and ￿1:46 in the data.
4.4 Open Economy Considerations
In our model, the interest rate is the same for every country: The model is consistent with un-
restricted capital ￿ ows.24 In addition, allowing ￿rms￿equity shares to be traded within or across
22These are the sum of all ￿rms￿one-period pro￿ts, net of the operating and sunk entry costs [i.e., the payments
to organization capital in the language of Atkeson and Kehoe, 2005].
23In the data, the correlation between entry cost and business density (both in logs) is signi￿cant at the 1 percent
level; the correlation between entry cost and entry rate is signi￿cant at the 5 percent level.
24Models with heterogeneous ￿rms and endogenous TFP have been successful in the trade literature. See Melitz
[2008] and the references therein.
21borders would not change our results￿ each ￿rm would be valued at the present discounted value
of its expected pro￿ts. Moreover, since we assume that the productivity distribution is the same
across countries, the nationality of entering ￿rms is immaterial. The only restriction needed for our
results to hold is that a ￿rm with a given productivity level cannot replicate itself within a country
or across countries.
5 Conclusions
Di⁄erences in industry structure due to distorting policies are often seen as a reason for cross-
country variation in productivity and output. However, theoretical constructs must be confronted
with the data if they are to identify which policies are important and how much they a⁄ect economic
outcomes. In this paper, we have shown that the observed variation in regulatory entry costs leads to
substantial cross-country di⁄erences in TFP and output. Entry barriers allow unproductive ￿rms to
operate, changing the industry composition and lowering its average productivity. This mechanism
is complementary to the misallocation of capital and labor among a given set of operating ￿rms
emphasized by Restuccia and Rogerson [2008] and Hsieh and Klenow [2009]. The quantitative
e⁄ect of lower entry costs is similar to that of the marginal product equalization found by Hsieh
and Klenow [2009]. The latter implies a 1:30-1:50 (1:40-1:60) ratio of U.S. TFP to that of China
(India), while the corresponding empirically observed TFP ratio is 2:53 (3:12). We ￿nd that entry
costs lead to a 1:32 to 1:45 TFP ratio between countries with the lowest and the highest costs. The
corresponding ratio in the data is 3:26.
The model developed here can be extended further to study the combined e⁄ect of entry barriers
and other sources of misallocation analyzed in the literature. For example, we leave for further
research the study of the interaction of entry costs with borrowing constraints [see Buera and Shin,
2010, Buera et al., 2010] and an analysis of various distortionary policies of the kind analyzed by
Restuccia and Rogerson [2008] and Guner et al. [2008] in conjunction with costly entry.
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34A Data Sources and De￿nitions
1. Entry costs: The World Bank [2004, 2005, 2006a,b, 2007].25
￿ Entry costs are constructed for ￿a ￿ standardized￿￿rm which has the following character-
istics: 1) it performs general industrial or commercial activities, it operates in the largest
city (by population), 2) it is exempt from industry-speci￿c requirements (including en-
vironmental ones), it does not participate in foreign trade and does not trade in goods
that are subject to excise taxes (e.g., liquor, tobacco, gas), it is a domestically-owned
limited liability company, 3) its capital is subscribed in cash (not in-kind contributions)
and is the higher of (i) 10 times GDP per capita in 1999 or (ii) the minimum capital
requirement for the particular type of business entity, it rents (i.e., does not own) land
and business premises, it has between 5 and 50 employees one month after the com-
mencement of operations, all of whom are nationals, it has turnover of up to 10 times
its start-up capital, and it does not qualify for investment incentives.￿
￿ Time required to complete the procedures required to start a business, i.e., the oppor-
tunity cost of the entrepreneur￿ s time. This is measured in the same units as the entry
cost above (i.e., as a percentage of GNI per capita) by dividing the number of days by
2.64.26
￿ Construction permits27: is the cost of obtaining construction permits, inspections, and
utility connections for a business in the construction industry to build a standardized
warehouse.
￿ Time required to obtain construction permits, including inspections and utility connec-
tions: Number of days divided by 2.64.
￿ Minimum capital requirement: The paid-in minimum capital which a ￿rms has to deposit
in a bank or with a notary before registration begins.
25Available at http://www.doingbusiness.org/.
26The number of days divided by 264, i.e., 22 working days per month times 12, gives the time in years. Multiplying
by GNI per capita converts that in US$. Finally, dividing by GNI per capita and multiplying by 100 gives the value
as a percentage of GNI per capita.
27See http://www.doingbusiness.org/MethodologySurveys/DealingLicenses.aspx.
35For some countries, data for one or more of the years 2004-2008 are missing. We ignore
these years when constructing averages. All but the last variables above have been converted
as percentages of GDP per worker in 2000 multiplying by real gross domestic income and
dividing by real GDP per worker from Heston et al. [2002].
2. Output: For 1996 and 2000 we use real GDP chain per worker from Heston et al. [2002];28
for 2003 we use the same variable from Heston et al. [2006].29
3. TFP: Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare [2005] for 1996 and 2000;30 for 2003 no measure of TFP
is available.
4. Distribution of employment and ￿rms by size class for the U.S.: Helfand et al. [2007]. We
averaged annual data over the period 1990-2005.
5. Gross job reallocation rate: average 1992-2005; Business Employment Dynamics (BED) and
Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS).31
The BED provides quarterly data for ￿rms and establishments; the BDS provides annual data
for establishments. We can combine this information to construct annual job creation and















where the subscripts Q, A, E, and F denote quarterly, annual, establishments, and ￿rms,
respectively. The gross job reallocation rate is the sum of the job creation and job destruction
rates: (13:98 + 12:30) = 26:28%.
6. Hazard function and size of entering/exiting ￿rms relative to incumbents: Bartelsman et al.
[2004].
7. Share of output paid to the owners of organization capital: Atkeson and Kehoe [2005, Table
1, p. 1045].
28This is the measure of real GDP used by Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare [2005] to construct TFP.
29See http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/.
30Available at http://www.klenow.com/.
31See http://www.bls.gov/bdm/ and http://www.ces.census.gov/index.php/bds.
368. Entry rate and business density: Djankov et al. [2010].
￿ Business density: ￿The number of businesses legally registered divided by working pop-
ulation (total population aged 15 to 64). Only businesses with more than one employee
are included. The variable is scaled to measure the number of businesses per 100 people
in the workforce.￿
￿ Entry rate: ￿The average number of businesses that registered per year between 2000
and 2004. Only businesses with more than one employee are included.￿
37